Author Archives: Brian Porter-Szucs

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Hostility to Islam in France and Poland

An article in today’s Washington Post by Adam Taylor offers a very disturbing comparison between anti-Muslim sentiment in Poland and France. Actually, the headline focuses on France, and the statistics offer information about many European countries, but after Interior Minister Mariusz Blaszczak’s idiotic statements in response to the Nice tragedy (which I won’t dignify with a link), Poland jumped forward as Mr. Taylor’s main point of comparison.

The picture drawn in this article basically reinforces every orientalist prejudice about the bigoted, xenophobic, “backward” Poles. Whereas recent surveys show that only 29% of people in France hold unfavorable views of Islam, 66% of Poles do. This despite the fact that the Islamic minority in Poland is about 0.1% of the population, compared to somewhere between 5% and 12% in France (since the French census doesn’t ask about religion, we can’t be certain).

I’m not going to deny the validity of this survey data (in fact, it’s confirmed elsewhere), but I do think some caution is in order as we attempt to interpret the numbers. Between 2015 and 2016 there was a 10% increase in the number of Poles expressing negative attitudes about Islam, and anyone following public rhetoric in Poland will guess why this might be. Prior to 2015 there was almost no discussion of Muslim immigration in Poland, for the simple reason that almost no people from the Middle East or North Africa were coming here. Information or debates dealing with Islam were categorized as foreign news, and given little attention. The Polish survey firm CBOS has been asking about attitudes towards various groups of foreigners since 1990, and by 2015 they were measuring responses to 32 different nationalities or ethnicities. Among these, the only examples from the Islamic world were Turks (added to the survey in 2005) and Palestinians (added in 2013). Significantly, though in 2005 a slight majority (53%) of Poles expressed negative attitudes about people from Turkey, this figure fell steadily every year until it reached the mid-30s in 2009. When the Palestinians were added to the survey, they came in at about the same point. This put Polish attitudes towards these two groups at roughly the same level as towards Russians or Ukrainians. As I’ve written about before (on multiple occasions), Polish attitudes towards foreigners of all varieties had been improving steadily and dramatically up to 2015, with only one big temporary spike back towards hostility in 2005-2006. In 2015, this trend was reversed, and in 2016 it is even worse. While every good academic will remind everyone that correlation is not causation, surely it isn’t a stretch to suggest that these trends have something to do with the fact that PiS held power in Poland in precisely these years.

One could argue that having someone like Jarosław Kaczyński in power simply empowers people to say what they really think. Or we could speculate that the prominence of anti-Islamic propaganda in the Polish state media under PiS rule might have something to do with this. Either way, we simply cannot take political culture out of our analysis of these comparative statistics. When Poles express opinions about Muslims they are basing their responses almost entirely on what they’ve seen in the media. Only 12% of Poles claim to have ever met an actual Muslim, and even that figure is definitely exaggerated (unless the few thousand Muslims here are extremely sociable).

My point is not that Poles are paragons of multicultural tolerance—they aren’t. But I refuse to believe that the contrast between France and Poland is as stark as the figures cited by the Washington Post suggest. Even a cursory familiarity with ethnic relations in France shows how much discrimination and hostility Muslim immigrants face in that country, but the cultural norms of civic inclusivity (on the rhetorical level) have led to a situation in which the French feel compelled to say “I don’t have anything against Islam, but….” In contrast, in Poland that sort of linguistic restraint is less acutely felt. Over the past 25 years, Polish public culture has made enormous strides towards instituting such restraint, as shown by the incredible drop in overt expressions of public antisemitism (from 51% declaring their antipathy to Jews in 1993, compared to 32% in 2015). I think we can credit Poland’s elites, including many prominent conservatives, for establishing a public sphere in which it was harder and harder to talk about hatred.

At least, we could until 2015.


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Etnoliga

Too many of the posts on this blog have been depressing, because events in Poland for the past year have been so troubling. But let’s all remember that the Polish government does not define Poland–in fact, even if we add together the supporters of  PiS and the smaller radical-right parties, they still don’t constitute a majority of the population. OK–they are at 47% as of now, but that’s not a majority!

I saw something yesterday that reminded me of how many great things are happening in Poland, if one just takes the time to look past national politics and see what people are doing on the local level.  I was visiting the wonderful sculpture park in the Warsaw neighborhood of Bródno, when I came across a soccer game organized under the auspices of the “Etnoliga.” This league consists of teams of adults (16 years old and up) with a very distinctive set of requirements: each 8-12 person team must include at least three men, at least three women, and representatives of at least three different nationalities. Connected with the games (which are scheduled for the next eight Saturdays) are various multicultural programs. The best thing about this initiative is that it is really international: not just the familiar East-Central European national communities, but immigrants from Nigeria, Egypt, Iran, Columbia, and more. As my daughter enjoyed herself at the amazing play structure at the Park Bródnowski, alongside her were kids as multi-hued as we might see in a park back home in Ann Arbor–all speaking flawless Polish. Of course I’m aware that this is a tiny microcosm in a country that remains extraordinarily homogeneous. And of course I know that those kids face teasing (or worse) in school, and that their parents face enormous difficulties. But for a moment on that lovely summer afternoon in Bródno, it was possible to set that aside, applaud the organizers of the Etnoliga program, and remember that Poland includes countless local projects like this. Whatever ugliness or idiocy we read about in the news, let’s not forget this Poland.

 


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Poland’s New Pantheon

The PiS regime is hoping to use this weekend’s NATO summit in Warsaw as an opportunity to push its historical agenda of martyrology and grievance. Their (misguided) conviction is that foreigners will respect Poland more if the country’s history is presented as a story of heroism, victimization, resistance to (always external) injustice, and above all national unity and homogeneity.

Yesterday I observed a strange ceremony on Piłsudski Square, just outside the Ministry of Defense building. Though staged on that massive public space, it was not a public event: there had been no advance publicity, and the only observers were a handful of curious tourists and the cameras of TVP (which once stood for Telewizja Polska, but nowadays would be more accurately labeled Telewizja Propaganda). I only happened upon the event because my apartment is nearby (I’m in Poland for the coming academic year), and I noticed a group of people dressed in historical costumes walking by. They represented various eras in Poland’s history, with the 19th and 20th century uprisings most prominently represented. Surrounding them was a handful of dignitaries and a unit of present-day soldiers, but when I asked one of the latter what was happening, he replied, “it’s something about an exhibition, but I don’t know anything else.”

It was indeed the official opening of an exhibition: one that was prominently displayed on the outside of the Ministry of Defence building, covering the façade that faces Piłsudski Square. It consisted of portraits of some famous Poles, with each accompanied by a short description or quotation in both Polish and English. The tiny audience was soon addressed by Wojciech Fałkowski, an Ministry of Defense official who introduced himself as a historian. He said that the exhibit was designed partially for Poles, but primarily for foreigners who might be in Warsaw because of the NATO summit or the upcoming Catholic World Youth Days. With this in mind, the government had prepared an English-language booklet that summarized Poland’s greatest accomplishments. The booklet was distributed to the assembled observers, though as far as I could tell, everyone (other than me and a few puzzled tourists) was Polish. Fałkowski lamented that foreigners knew almost nothing about Poland’s glorious past, but if they did, they would understand how important the nation was and respect the Poles more. It was therefore necessary, he continued, to propagate awareness of Poland’s greatest individuals (thus the portraits) alongside the country’s military accomplishments (outlined in the booklet).

Warsaw 7-2016 Nato MON Exhibit (14)

Is ignorance about Polish history actually a distinctive problem? It would seem to be in my interest to agree that everyone should know more about Poland’s past, but let’s be realistic: ignorance about Poland history is no greater than ignorance of any other country of similar size. In the US, our young people don’t even know much about American history, so we need to put their lack of knowledge about Poland in context. For that matter, I wonder how much Poles know about Sudan, Algeria, Uganda, or Iraq (to name the countries closest to Poland in population) or Thailand, Argentina, Egypt, or Pakistan (to name the countries closest to Poland in total GDP).

Perhaps there’s a generic problem of historical ignorance, but I wish we could put to rest the idea that Poland is disproportionately, much less uniquely, invisible. In fact, based on my own (perhaps unrepresentative) experiences, interest in Poland is broad and growing. My course on modern Polish history gets more enrollment (around 100 students) than any other course I offer, including my surveys of modern Roman Catholic history, global economic history, and the history of WWI and WWII in Europe.

If my enrollment trends are unusual, perhaps it is precisely because I do not teach the sort of Polish history represented by the PiS worldview. That Ministry of Defense display, together with the accompanying booklet, exemplified an approach that focused on Great Men (and a few Great Women). At the center of the display, covering two floors of the building, was Pope St. John Paul II (of course). Surrounding him was the following pantheon:

  • Kazimierz the Great
  • Jadwiga d’Anjou
  • Copernicus
  • Mikołaj Rej
  • Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski
  • Jan Heweliusz
  • Paweł Edmund Strzelecki
  • Adam Mickiewicz
  • Juliusz Słowacki
  • Fryderyk Chopin
  • Ignacy Łukasiewicz
  • Jan Matejko
  • Helena Modrzejewska
  • Albert Chmielowski
  • Henryk Sienkiewicz
  • Ignacy Jan Paderewski
  • Roman Dmowski
  • Władysław Reymont
  • Maria Skłodowska-Curie
  • Henryk Arctowski
  • Janusz Korczak
  • Stefan Banach
  • Maksymilian Kolbe
  • Marian Rejewski
  • Faustyna Kowalska
  • Czesław Miłosz
  • Stanisław Lem
  • Father Jerzy Popiełuszko

The way this list is presented reflects a set of values that only a minority of foreign visitors (not to mention Poles) are going to find appealing. The actual line-up of people represents a variety of ideological perspectives, but the (sloppily translated) captions and quotations underneath the pictures present a more unitary vision. Sienkiewicz, for example, informs viewers that “the motherland [sic—ojczyzna] and the faith are a single giant altar,” and Dmowski proclaims that “the motherland is above all the nation, then the stage [sic—should be state]: without the nation, there can be no state.” Further on, Faustyna Kowalska is quoted as saying “O, how good [it] is to live a life of obedience, [to] be aware that everything I do is pleasant to God.” Lines like these present a vision of nationalist homogeneity and conformity that reflects quite well PiS’s “polityka historyczna.

I shudder to imagine what Miłosz would think about his inclusion alongside the likes of Dmowski, but the exhibit gives no sense of any tension here: it manages to make the great poet seem anodyne by quoting the bromide, “O tym, kto kim jest, nie decyduje pieniądz” (translated as “Who is who is not determined by money.”) It is hard to quibble with that sentiment, but is this really the most representative line of Miłosz’s poetry that they could find? Amazingly, Janusz Korczak is identified simply as a “pedagouge [sic] and great friend of children.” He is quoted as saying, “When a child smiles, the whole world is smiling.” That he was a Jew murdered in the Holocaust is left unmentioned. Placing him in the same pantheon as Dmowski is scandalous beyond words.

It is significant that Piłsudski’s portrait was not included in the exhibit, though his statue is nearby. Given his lifelong goal of building the sort of state that could contain multiple languages and religions, he would probably have been glad to have been excluded. Missing also, of course, were any references to ideals like respect for the rule of law, acceptance of diversity, or a commitment to peace and prosperity. Missing were the great figures of Poland’s legal and constitutional tradition: people like Paweł Włodkowicz (the 15th century advocate for equal rights for Christians and non-Christians); any of the authors of the 1573 Confederation of Warsaw (which not only eschewed religiously motivated violence, but declared that the community of Poles included people of many faiths); any of the authors of the path-breaking constitution of May 3, 1791 (which encoded the idea that the law stands higher than the ruler); any exemplars of the Polish tradition of social democracy; and above all any of the towering figures who created modern Poland through the Solidarity movement of 1980-1981 and the Round Tabled Negotiations of 1989. If there is one name that most visitors of Poland will know and should know (other than John Paul II), it would surely be Lech Wałęsa. And it wouldn’t hurt to spread the renown of people like Jacek Kuroń, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, or Bronisław Geremek, though I fear that we won’t be seeing monuments to them any time soon.

 

 


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Protests and Patriotism

A petition is currently circulating among Polish Studies scholars regarding the fate of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk (click here for background on the scandal). The text of the letter is below, and I urge everyone who agrees with its message to join this protest by emailing the organizers, John Connelly and Christian Osterman. The fundamental issues involved are of vital importance, and I enthusiastically agree that the international community of Polish Studies scholars must speak out. That said, I think the letter also raises some issues that merit further consideration and discussion.

Here is the text of the letter:

We emphatically protest plans to discontinue the World War II museum in Gdańsk, Poland’s northern Port city, known to people everywhere as the birthplace of Solidarity. A huge exhibition is almost ready for visitors, reflecting years of hard work as well as expenditures of many millions of dollars. To close it now would constitute a grave injustice, unprecedented in the democratic western world.

The exhibition shows indelibly the costs Poland bore as the first nation to say no to Hitler, but also highlights Poland’s contributions to victory on innumerable fronts: military, diplomatic, intellectual and moral. Each episode is treated in dispassionate professional terms, and will make Poles proud of the nation’s heroism, but also of its willingness to confront difficult questions that emerge from its past. The museum does justice to the history of a people that has suffered under regimes of propaganda and distortion, and knows perhaps better than any other that truth sets us free.

Foreign audiences will flock to this museum because it is about World War II across the globe. But precisely its global reach permits visitors to encounter inspiring deeds of Poland’s past on a background in which they can be seen and understood. For example we perceive the heroism of Poland’s enormous and complex underground resistance only by seeing it contrasted to movements in other places. In how many places were people willing to die for the sake of poetry?

We urge Poland’s elected leaders to permit the WWII museum to open on schedule; any interruption in its work will count as tragedy in the eyes of all who study the past and all who care about Poland’s future.

I want to emphasize again that I sincerely respect the authors of this letter. I commend them for organizing this protest, and I share their anger and incredulity that the museum is threatened. Nonetheless, I am not sure that this is the best approach.

Were I not familiar with the situation in Poland, I would assume from reading this protest that the museum was threatened with closure by a group of lefty cosmopolitans who wanted to prevent the world from realizing Poland’s glorious contribution to victory in WWII. In fact, every PiS supporter would be delighted to have a museum that would “highlight Poland’s contributions to victory,” recount the “inspiring deeds of Poland’s past,” and “do justice to the history of a people that has suffered under regimes of propaganda and distortion.” Surely Kaczyński himself wants the world to see Poland as a land that “knows perhaps better than any other that truth sets us free” as a country that collectively “said no to Hitler,” and as a place where people are uniquely “willing to die for the sake of poetry.” PiS wants Poland to be seen as a land where outside forces of evil constantly bring bloodshed and tyranny, rendering the country into history’s perpetual victim and martyr.

Elsewhere I have argued against this interpretation of Polish history, and I don’t want to rehash my objections here. What matters now are the implications of trying to build a defense of Polish democracy on the foundation of national martyrology. We are faced with a government that wants to shut down or marginalize historical debate and discussion, to enforce a single vision of Poland’s past, and to push all those who disagree with them out of the public sphere. I am skeptical that we can we fight the imposition of Kaczyński’s “polityka historyczna” in the name of an alternative, only slightly more mild version of the same. Can we resist their martyrologies, their maudlin phraseology, their patriotic clichés, and their national exceptionalism by merely countering with a few amendments and qualifications?  We do indeed need to use “dispassionate professional terms” when discussing these matters, but (as this letter exemplifies) it is very hard to do so if we stay within the familiar tropes of Polish patriotism. I don’t believe that the PiS vision of history can be opposed by saying “yes, but…”

Of course, for Kaczyński it is unacceptable to even mention antisemitism, to even hint that there were Poles who found the call to “die for poetry” insufficiently motivational, to even suggest that there are any complexities or nuances worth considering. That’s why a purge is underway. And that is what we must protest.

Those of us who study Poland from afar, in my opinion, do no favors to our Polish friends and colleagues when we perpetuate a heroic, lachrymose, or martyrological understanding of Poland’s past (or present). Of course we need to talk about the catastrophe of the Second World War, and we should highlight the fact that northeastern Europe was one of the primary sites of that world-wide disaster. In percentage terms, the citizens of the Second Polish Republic suffered more casualties than any other country in WWII, and even if we separate Jewish and non-Jewish casualties, the numbers are still beyond imagining. And yes, the Polish resistance movement was among the largest in Nazi-occupied Europe—perhaps the largest. But if we write about those years within a genre of heroic tragedy, it then becomes hard to incorporate the nuances and complexities that usually characterize good historical scholarship. Even more important at the moment, we find ourselves on very tenuous ground when attacked by those who want to advance the same story, but without any of the qualifications we might want to add.

I recognize that right now the specifics of this debate are of secondary importance. For precisely this reason, though, I feel that we should unify around what we share: a commitment to maintaining a space for differing points of view and an opposition to attempts by the Polish government to impose one and only one historical interpretation. I believe that as scholars we must take a stand against the very idea of a state-sponsored “polityka historyczna,” rather than arguing about what specific message such a polityka should convey.

 


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So Far, PiS has a Secure Hold on Power

I’m not sure that there’s much point in tracking survey data about the popularity of the Law and Justice movement. First, between now and the next elections there are certain to be a lot of ups and downs for all the major parties in Poland, and we can’t make any projections based on the current situation. Beyond that, however, is the deeper question of whether polling data even matters for Kaczyński. The way he has created his new political order—acting as if he has an uncontested national mandate despite winning just over a third of the vote—shows that he does not consider his legitimacy to stem from popularity. He believes that he speaks for the nation in its transcendent and transhistorical form, whereas the shifting sands of public support represent (as Kaczyński’s hero Roman Dmowski often said) the momentary whims of people with limited political “maturity” and “reason.” As many leading PiS activists have said, those who protest against the new regime represent people with a “genetic” disposition for treason, people who aren’t really Polish, and people who just can’t reconcile themselves to their loss of power. So the defense mechanisms within PiS against changes in their popular support are very strong.

But even if it is irrelevant in practical terms, it is illuminating to consider what sort of popular resonance the PiS revolution enjoys. There are several ways we might assess this. Just considering support for PiS itself, there has been a marked decline of more than 10 percentage points since the elections last October. The invaluable website ewybory.eu has been maintaining a running tally that averages the results from all the major polling firms, from TNS Polska and CBOS (which tend to report significantly higher levels of PiS support) to Pollster and IBRIS (which tend to produce much lower figures). This polling average is now at 29%, a considerable drop from the highpoint of 42% last summer or 38% at the time of the October elections.

But we need to be careful here, because that figure doesn’t mean much in isolation. If PiS support is shifting towards other far-right parties like Kukiz or Korwin, then the overall picture doesn’t change. And even if there was an overall shift towards the broad cluster of parties that remain loyal to the Third Republic’s constitution, that won’t matter if a significant share of that anti-PiS vote remains fragmented among parties too small to pass the necessary 5% limit needed to win Sejm delegates.

So here are two ways to consider the recent ups and downs of the survey data—and now I’m going to shift to the disaggregated data, representing each survey separately regardless of the firm that carried it out. The first groups together PiS, Kukiz, and Korwin on one side and Nowoczesna, Platforma, PSL, SLD, and Razem on the other. The numbers do not add up to 100% because of those who reply “unsure” and those who pick one of the several micro-parties.
Polling_March_2016_3

We could read this as a signal that PiS and its potential partners have rarely been above 50%. On the other hand, the Constitutional Coalition is similarly short of a majority. Just comparing the two, we see that they have been trading places up and down, depending on the survey. Neither side in this struggle can take much solace in these results.

Polling_March_2016_1

But so far I’ve just considered the notional support for each party, without taking into account whether or not they would actually make it into the Sejm if elections were held today. So what would happen if we cut all the results that fall below the 5% mark (or 8%, in the case of coalitions like SLD)?

Polling_March_2016_2

Now all the numbers shift upwards. Put simply, if elections were held today PiS would be favored to win once again. As last time, they would fall well short of a majority, and even a coalition among all their potential allies would not be enough. But when the 5% rule is considered, their prospects improve dramatically. The legal quirk that allowed PiS to get more than half the Sejm delegates even though they won only 38% of the vote would continue to work in Kaczyński’s favor.

The bottom line is that the only way to stop PiS would be to form a single grand coalition of all the potential anti-PiS parties, from the libertarians in Nowoczesna to the socialists in Razem. Even then it would be a close election, in all likelihood. Is this a viable possibility? It’s hard to see it happening given the ideological caverns that separate the opposition parties. It is one thing to protest together in defense of constitutional legality; it is another matter entirely to envision a functioning coalition with any positive message at all. I fear that the only conclusion at this time is to recognize that for PiS to lose power they will have to fall a good deal further in popularity. Moreover, their support will need to swing not to one of the other far-right parties, but to one of the liberal or socialist parties in the anti-PiS cluster. There are not signs of that happening yet.


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How to Write a Headline about Conspiracy Theories

Kudos to Reuters (and others) for running the headline today, “Polish Minister says Foul Play Behind President’s Jet Crash.”  This contrasts with many press outlets that have been describing this as a dispute between “Poland” and “Russia” regarding the tragic 2010 accident that killed almost 100 Polish government officials (including president Lech Kaczyński).  Perhaps the difference between the vague shorthand “Poland” and the more concrete reference to a single state official is mere semantics, but I think specificity matters in this case. On this issue there is very little ambiguity: a whopping eight percent of Poles believe that the crash was an assassination and another 23% are willing to consider the possibility — and even those figures come after years of concerted publicity work from conspiracy theorists.  The government official who has made these charges, Antoni Macierewicz, has for years been peddling stories of plots involving Donald Tusk (the prime minister in 2010) and the Russians — stories that have been debunked by every serious expert who has examined the evidence. When looking to identify genuine Antabuse 250mg suppliers, it’s crucial to start with a thorough examination of the supplier’s credentials and licensing. Trusted suppliers will typically have licenses granted by recognized regulatory authorities, like the FDA in the United States or the MHRA in the UK.  So let’s be very clear: there was no conspiracy, and the vast majority of Poles recognize this. That’s not to say that the Russians have presented a model of transparency regarding the details of the crash, which may have involved more ineptitude on their part than Putin would like to acknowledge.  But right now that is not the issue: what does matter is that the current government in Poland is trying to use this issue for domestic political purposes. They have already re-opened an investigation into the crash, with a commission consisting entirely of people who have already expressed allegiance to Macierewicz’s ideas. Worse, they have brought charges against key figures in Mr. Tusk’s administration, while simultaneously undermining the independence of the Polish judiciary.  There is a very real possibility that innocent people will go to jail.  The Polish government cannot go after Tusk himself now, because of his role as President of the European Council, but Kaczyński and Macierewicz have made it clear that they hope someday to bring to justice those they consider ultimately responsible for the crash — first and foremost, Donald Tusk. It is quite easy to make fun of Mr. Macierewicz and to dismiss his ideas, but this is no longer a laughing matter.

 


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On Being a Professor in a Time of Extremism

Most of us in higher education hold to a set of ethical standards that govern how and what we teach. As a historian, I want to help my students develop a nuanced view of the world, I want them to recognize the importance of contextualizing problems in both time and space, and I want them to nurture an empathic understanding of the perspectives and worldviews of people unlike themselves. These aren’t just intellectual and pedagogical goals; taken together, they sketch a broad moral framework grounded in a commitment to democratic citizenship.

These values are under threat in many parts of the world today, which places scholars in a difficult position. The pursuit of our seemingly banal educational goals places us at odds with some powerful political movements, whether we are in the United States, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Russia, India…the list is long and growing longer. Yet we continue to value scholarly impartiality, nonpartisanship, and “unbiased” inquiry. Reconciling these two sets of ideals is becoming difficult.

As an American who specializes in Polish studies, I feel doubly burdened right now with the rise of Jarosław Kaczyński and Donald Trump. I have been explicitly and publically critical of the former, leading to accusations that I have sacrificed my intellectual credibility as a neutral observer. I am still trying to figure out how I should react to the latter—not as an ordinary citizen (that decision is easy) but specifically in my capacity as a professor at a public university. The rules at my institution are clear: I cannot claim, or even allow to be inferred, that any statements I make regarding any politician or political moment are sanctioned or endorsed by my university. Following that proscription seems easy enough, since I’m writing this blog at home, on my personal computer, and publishing it on my private website. Oh, if only things were that straight-forward!

I’m currently teaching a class called “Poland in the Modern World, 1900-the present.” What do I do when we get to “the present” on the syllabus? The current government in Poland, led by Jarosław Kaczyński’s “Law and Justice” movement (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), has openly defied Poland’s constitutional court, transformed the public media into a government mouthpiece, purged the civil service, and launched legal procedures against political opponents based on dubious conspiracy theories. These actions have led to a constitutional crisis and threaten to derail the stunning accomplishments Poland has achieved over the past two decades. I take the preceding two sentences to be a mere summary of recent events, but supporters of PiS would say that I have betrayed my ideological predilections by spreading misinformation. They insist that they are just trying to restore national pride and improve the lives of ordinary Poles, and that accusations like mine serve the entrenched elites who are trying to block much-needed reforms. So have I undermined my standing as a scholar by expressing an opinion in a contested public debate? And would I further compromise myself if I fail to show “balance” when I present this material to my students?

I take those rhetorical questions seriously. Even when I present to my students issues of far greater moral clarity, I strive to offer them alternative viewpoints. When we studied the communist seizure of power in Poland after WWII, I had them read documents from both the communists and their opponents. When we discussed interethnic relations in the 1920s and 1930s, I provided texts from liberals, socialists, and nationalists, as well as from Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians. And when we do get to the part of the class that deals with current affairs, my students will be assigned primary sources illuminating a range of views.

Yet if my foundational pedagogical goal is indeed to cultivate democratic citizenship, cultural empathy, and a nuanced understanding of social and political relations, then I would be a hypocrite to treat all the aforementioned views as equivalent. I don’t hesitate to describe the Stalinists as violent authoritarians, to characterize the Nazi occupation during WWII as genocidal, to label the interwar nationalists as antisemitic. Should my treatment of the current government be different? If I criticize the communists for ignoring constitutional constraints and for manipulating the media, should I present examples of the same phenomena today as mere differences of opinion? To do so, I believe, would place me alongside biologists who won’t talk about evolution, or climatologists who remain silent about global warming.

Even if I was to conclude that I should avoid present-day controversies in the classroom, what about my other public statements and writings? I have received some criticism for abandoning the ideal of “unbiased” scholarship by writing critically about Kaczyński. My opinion, however, is that those of us with a public platform, however small, have a duty to say something during a moment of crisis like this one. I have the luxury of being a full professor at an internationally recognized institution, without any of the vulnerabilities that untenured scholars in the US or any of my colleagues inside Poland might face. Whatever tiny bit of visibility might come with that position of security carries with it the obligation to at least publicize what’s going on in Poland today. Sure, doing so demonstrates bias, but not doing so demonstrates cowardice or (just as bad) apathy.

To me the choice to write about the danger to democracy in today’s Poland was relatively easy. A much harder challenge faces the American academy in the months ahead, as we move closer to a presidential election in which one of the candidates, Donald Trump, represents a worldview and a political style frighteningly similar to what the Poles have confronted this past year. Throughout my career, I made sure that my public writings and statements avoided explicit commentary on US politics, mainly because the topic is outside my professional expertise. Even when I talked or wrote about issues with obvious resonance in the present, I always took care to keep it abstract, perhaps criticizing a certain set of policies but never a specific party or individual in the United States. But can this balancing act be sustained in the age of Trump? I have no professional standing to speak with any expertise about what’s happening to my country. I’m just a citizen, so maybe the ethically correct stance is to retain a firewall between by views as an American and my views as a scholar. But can such a firewall persist when there is an actual threat to the core values of liberal democracy?

For anyone inclined to declare an absolute principle of neutrality in such circumstances, let me just dive right into the argumentum ad Hitlerum. Professors in German universities in the 1930s, regardless of academic discipline, had to choose how to respond to the rise of Nazism, and posterity has not been kind to those who opted to adjust their teaching to accommodate the strictures of the new regime. Even those who simply kept their heads down and tried to avoid politics often implicated themselves, at least tangentially, in the crimes that followed. I fully understand why someone may have followed a strategy of disengagement, particularly if they taught in a field that did not initially seem relevant to the Nazis. But I’m sure that we all admire most those who used their public positions to speak out, to protest, to mark the point at which they had to declare non possumus.

I jumped immediately to that most extreme case not to suggest that in 2016 we have returned to 1933; instead, I merely want to note that such moments of decision might potentially arise. If we grant that, then we must ask ourselves how bad things must get before the ethical issues arise. Unfortunately, it will rarely be clear until it is too late—but on the other hand, we are always vulnerable to false alarms that might make us look foolish in retrospect. I’m setting aside the question of what we might do, or how effective we could possibly be. Those concerns only arise if we first decide on the right thing to do. On the one side is risk that we will confirm that oft-leveled accusation that we academics are biased, and that the universities are bastions of leftist ideologies. On the other side is the possibility that our children might someday ask why we squandered whatever limited cultural capital we possessed, back when there was still time.


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Lech Wałęsa and the Politics of History

We need to set the substantive argument aside right at the start: there is no way we will ever know for sure whether Lech Wałęsa gave information to the communist security services in the early 1970s. The political stakes here are simply too high for any evidence to be persuasive for those not already predisposed to one or the other position.

People outside Poland are mystified by this whole affair. How could the man who led the movement that toppled the communists in Poland, and began the process that led ultimately to the overthrow of communism throughout Eastern Europe, be a communist agent? It seems more like a headline from The Onion than a serious news item.

But the suspicions are all too real, and therein lies the story that we should follow. The current government in Poland is hard to fit into any familiar ideological categories, as I have argued elsewhere. One can read the documents and speeches of Jarosław Kaczyński and his Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), but that will only cast a partial light on this unusual phenomenon. Holding together all those disjointed beliefs is a story about Poland’s recent history, and if you believe that story, then everything PiS is doing makes perfect sense. What follows is a summary of the PiS understanding of history—it definitely does not reflect my own interpretations (which can be found here), and its connection to what actually happened is (to be charitable) tenuous.

The tale begins about four decades ago, as the Polish People’s Republic was unravelling. The economy in the late 1970s was no longer growing, shortages were endemic, and the communist leadership had lost all legitimacy. The Solidarity Movement nearly toppled the communists in 1980-1981, only to be suppressed by a military coup carried out by enemies of the Polish nation. Afterwards the communists realized that their days were numbered, so they began planning a way to hold on to real power even as they appeared to surrender political authority. Working with collaborators highly placed within the Solidarity movement—mostly members of the intelligentsia, who never did have a genuine bond with the Polish people—the communists staged the so-called “Round Table Talks” of 1989. The arrangement that came out of these negotiations enabled the old state apparatus to seize the nation’s wealth in the name of “privatization,” allowing the creation of what seemed on the surface to be a democracy. But it was not a true democracy, because it was manipulated by unseen forces in league with foreign interests. These morally bankrupt people ensured that the state would remain weak, allowing private interests from the one side and international forces from the other to keep the Polish nation powerless and poor. Since Pope John Paul II endorsed Poland’s entrance to the European Union, that must have been a good thing. Nonetheless, the corrupt elites running Poland allowed Brussels to continue the assault on the nation, undermining Polish morality by pushing alien values like gay rights and feminism. It seemed like all this might get turned around in 2005, when PiS first rose to power, but the enemies were too strong. Simply removing Jarosław Kaczyński from the prime minister’s office in 2007 wasn’t enough for them, because his twin brother Lech Kaczyński remained the country’s president. In 2010, therefore, they plotted to eliminate the nation’s defenders once and for all. When nearly 100 of Poland’s greatest leaders, including President Kaczyński and his wife, travelled to Smolensk, Russia, to attend a ceremony commemorating a WWII massacre of Polish POWs by Stalinist forces (certainly not a coincidence!), their plane was brought down and everyone on board was killed. Donald Tusk, then the Polish Prime Minister and now the President of the European Union, is responsible (at least morally, but probably directly) for this assassination, most likely in league with Vladimir Putin and/or Angela Merkel. From those dark times, Jarosław Kaczyński led the movement of genuine Polish patriots gradually back to power, finally triumphing in 2015 by putting PiS loyalists in the offices of president and prime minister. Now the old elite that had been holding Poland back for so many decades can finally be destroyed, and the pseudo-revolution of 1989 can be replaced with a genuine revolution that will return Poland’s greatness.

 Different components of this story are advocated in various combination, sometimes in vague terms that downplay the most explicit conspiratorial elements, sometimes in ways that make the plots even more byzantine. The key element throughout all these variations is a belief that the elite ruling Poland up until 2015 has its roots in the communist era, that the Third Republic (as the state created in 1989 was known) was not a genuine Polish democracy, and that all will be well if only those corrupt, cosmopolitan, anti-Polish forces can be vanquished. Crucially, that process must encompass both the present and the past, so that young Poles will understand who their genuine heroes should be.

This is the context for the most recent “revelation” that documents have been found “proving” that Lech Wałęsa was a communist agent. PiS-affiliated historians have in fact been making this case for many years, and these new developments only reinforce what they already believed. Because Wałęsa, as leader of Solidarity in the 1980s, made the key decisions leading to the 1989 Round Table negotiations, he must by definition have been either duped by Poland’s enemies, or openly collaborating  with them. Given his symbolic importance, he must be discredited in order for the field to be cleared, allowing new leaders to emerge. Jarosław Kaczyński has already been arguing that his brother should be the true symbol of Solidarity, replacing Wałęsa—this despite the fact that the Kaczyński twins were marginal figures in the 1980s. Then the proper rewriting of Poland’s recent past can begin, and the work of fully discrediting the existing Polish elite (economic, cultural, academic, and political) can proceed. Recently a new commission was formed to “investigate” the Smolensk crash, made up entirely of those who have already expressed their belief that it was an assassination. Legal prosecutions are also underway, and more are sure to follow.

When those who believe in conspiracy theories take power, we have to take their conspiracy theories very seriously. If they believe that the world works through plots and deception, then it follows that these are the methods that they consider appropriate to deploy against their enemies. Under these circumstances, it is quite extraordinary that the incriminating documents against Wałęsa have emerged precisely now, right after PiS successfully asserted its control over the domestic Polish media and the courts. Maybe they are legitimate, maybe the are not, but if we get bogged down in that debate we are missing the point. The argument itself sows all the doubt necessary to tarnish Wałęsa’s legacy, and that is what matters right now. Even if Jarosław Kaczyński fails to ever lift his own popularity (he continues to have the highest negative rating of any public figure in Poland, which is why he rules behind the scenes), he can at least ensure that everyone else gets dragged down to his level.


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KOD in their own words

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Continuing my effort to make the voices in current Polish debates available to an English-speaking audience, here is a text from the Committee for the Defense of Democracy that summarizes their opposition to the PiS government. As with my previous translation of PiS texts, you are free to use this as long as you credit the source.

The Committee for the Defense of Democracy

http://komitetobronydemokracji.pl/w-obronie-demokracji-w-polsce-by-znow-o-nia-nie-walczyc/

Translated and Annotated by Brian Porter-Szűcs

 

Ireneusz Doman Domański , “In Defense of Democracy.” (January 18, 2016).

 

Dear Europeans, Dear Citizens of the United States of America,

Maybe somewhere in France, Portugal, Great Britain, Germany, Romania or Czechia, in the USA or in some other free and democratic country, you are with some surprise asking the question: what’s going on in Poland?  Why are those Poles once again taking to the streets? What do they want?

I am not surprised by your surprise. After all, it might seem that nothing happened.  A new president was democratically elected, a party with the lovely name Law and Justice took power in democratic elections. It has a majority in both houses of parliament, it has formed its government.  Normal stuff.

So why, in November of 2015—that is, right after the elections—Krzysztof Łoziński, a writer, columnist, and member of Amnesty International who is known in his country as a figure from the period of struggle against the communist dictatorship, declared on the website Studio Opinii that it was necessary to create a Committee for the Defense of Democracy.

Why, within a few days after his call, KOD began to take form spontaneously and energetically, first on Facebook, and then in genuine reality? Why have the defenders of democracy received the support of Lech Wałęsa, Nobel Prize winner, legendary leader of Solidarity, former president of Poland?  Why did thousands begin to sign up on mass?  And why did thousands take to the streets throughout the entire country, in order to demonstrate and protest?

Łoziński wrote in his text, “the question often arises, what should one do when faced with open attempts to tear down democracy?”  Yes, there’s a lot of evidence that step by step democracy is being torn down here, and Poland risks being pushed to the margins and, in the near future, isolation. As a result of democratic elections, a right-wing group bearing left-wing postulates has risen to power. It is challenging the accomplishments of the past quarter century in my—in our country.  The country that I am proud of.  The one that that gives pride to many of my fellow Poles in Europe and around the world.

What else, other than poisoning or outright tearing down democracy, is paralyzing the Constitutional Tribunal, the pillar and guard of democracy in every democratic country?[1] How else can one label questioning the rulings of the Tribunal and refusing to honor them? Pushing through parliament at night (often at four in the morning!) legislation widely considered by constitutional experts and all sorts of legal organizations to be unconstitutional?  The legally and morally dubious “suspension” by the President of legal proceedings against an indicted politician of his party, so that he can become a government minister and direct the special services?[2] President Andrzej Duda has a law degree, and he is both a graduate and a faculty member of the academically respected Jagiellonian University. The law department of JU has already repudiated his actions!

Politicians from the government camp talk about placing Donald Tusk, the former Premier of Poland, and current head of the European Commission, on trial.[3] The Vice-Premier and Minister of Culture attempts to influence the repertoire of the theaters.[4] Representatives of the government proclaim that the will of the nation is above the law, above the Constitution! They proclaim that they have a mandate based on the will of the nation in order to do whatever they want.  There have been calls to arrest the Chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal if he does not surrender, and does not subordinate himself to the newly imposed principles of applying the law.  I should inform you, therefore, that the group currently in power got the votes of 18.7% of Poles eligible to vote.[5] That is a mandate to govern, but not to appropriate the country, not to nullify the Constitution that was accepted in a national referendum.  That is not a mandate to change the system.

In the Polish parliament the opposition is stripped of its voice.  They repeat a vote or change the composition of a parliamentary commission, if it so happens that the results are inconvenient for the current government. Delegates from the opposition receive drafts of important legislation at the last minute before debate, without any chance to become familiar with them.  All their suggestions and corrections are rejected. Legislation is voted on in haste that allows the government to assume control over the public media and carry out a purge in the editorial boards of the radio and television.[6] There are plans for legislation that would allow widespread surveillance and control over the internet and mail.[7] The nonpartisan civil service is being liquidated so that party functionaries can be named to all positions.[8]

Can you imagine this in your countries?  In Great Britain, Germany, Portugal, Czechia, or the USA? ….

This is why KOD exists, modeled on the Committee for the Defense of the Workers (Komitet Obrony Robotników, or KOR), which a was active in my country during the times of the communist dictatorship. I come from Radom. A city, where in June 1976 there was a massive rebellion of workers against the communist party, brutally repressed by the militia. Then the workers in Radom burned down the building of the central committee of the party that had the word “workers” in its name. To defend the people imprisoned and repressed in my city, KOR was created.  Jacek Kuroń, one of its leaders, a person with the best opposition bona fides, said then “don’t burn the committee headquarters! Create your own committees!”  We did just that.

And since the threat to democracy in my country is real, KOD quickly became a mass movement. A movement that not only does not question the results of the democratic elections, but respects it. We will not burn down any committee headquarters. We are not aggressors. We stand against the aggressors, in order to stop them.

Mateusz Kijowski, the leader of our movement, the Committee for the Defense of Democracy, wrote our manifesto on November 20:

Democracy in Poland is threatened.

The activities of the government, its disrespect for the law and for democratic norms, has forced us to express our decisive opposition.

We to not want a totalitarian Poland, closed to those who think differently than the government commands. We do not want a Poland full of frustration and demands for revenge.

We want Poland to be a place for all Poles, equal before the law, with their convictions, opinions, ethics, and aesthetics.

We do not accept the appropriation of the state, the division of Poles between better and worse, contempt for “others.”

We also do not accept views detrimental to the principles of democracy and human rights.

We are determined to speak openly and decisively, with a loud voice, about decency, law, and mutual respect. To express our opinions not only at home and on the internet, but also on the streets and the squares of our cities and in the countryside, if the need arises to gather there to express our opinions and our demands.

We invite everyone for whom the values of democracy are important, without regard to political views or faith, to join us.

We do not accept violations of the Constitution and the introduction of an authoritarian government through the abuse of democratic mechanisms.

There are among us people of various viewpoints and political orientations, from right to left, believers, agnostics, and atheists.  We are united by the fact that we are free people, and we want to continue to live in our own democratic country, in which no one will tell us how to live and what values to hold.

 

Signed: The Committee for the Defense of Democracy.

In December, 2015, the BBC asked Polish president Andrzej Duda about the anti-government demonstrations that the Committee for the Defense of Democracy organized in many Polish cities. “Those demonstrates consist mainly of those who used to govern Poland and were removed from power by the Polish voters in parliamentary elections,” said Andrzej Duda. He added that those people do not want to accept this fact, therefore—the President said—they are inciting society and organizing demonstrations.[9]

This is the narrative of those currently governing Poland. Thus spoke Jarosław Kaczyński, the chairman of the party that created the government.  He is himself a rank-and-file parliamentary delegate, and formally is not responsible for anything. But he is the one who calls us “the worst kind of Poles”[10] He is the one who, commenting on the protests, said that some Poles cooperated with the Gestapo (sic!), and others with the Home Army, the Polish underground army during the Second World War.[11] His party comrades call us “communists and criminals” who have been cut off from our food supply. People, who cannot accept the loss of power

That is a lie!  None of us, none of the thousands of people with the Committee for the Defense of Democracy, nor any of the participants in the demonstrations, lost any power. We never had it. I’m an ordinary Pole who is proud of the success of my country, who has enjoyed its growing (until now) prestige, who greatly values the freedom we fought for years ago, and who is ready to defend that freedom. That brutal language serves to divide Poles, to build walls.  The chairman of the group currently in power tries to realize his political vision. He does not have the power to change the Constitution.[12] Therefore he tries to weaken the mechanisms of oversight that protect the law and democracy: the Constitutional Tribunal, the free media, the independent judiciary, and independent prosecutors.[13] In mid December, 2015, Lech Wałęsa said on Radio Zet, “This is leading to misfortune, this will end badly, with fighting; they are driving us to a civil war and therefore, to avoid that, we must prepare structurally and organizationally, and already start gathering signatures for a referendum. If in a referendum there are more votes to end the term of the Sejm than were cast for PiS in the elections, then it would result in physically pushing them aside.”[14]

Many, among them politicians from the camp currently governing Poland, have said, “But this is a democracy, since you can demonstrate on the streets.” I answer them: it still is, but you are striking blows against it. But as long as it is, we will defend it, so that you don’t take it from us. Because we do not want to fight for it again, like during those long years before 1989. We did not want to create the Committee for the Defense of Democracy. But we had to. Because we do not want to create a Committee to Fight for Democracy. Unless we must

Then we will.

_________________

NOTES

[1] Shortly before the elections, the previous government filled five vacancies on the Constitutional Tribunal, including two that would not actually be vacated until just after the elections.  President Andrzej Duda refused to swear in any of the new justices.  A subsequent ruling by the court found that three of the appointments were legitimate, though the previous government had overstepped by trying to replace the other two. PiS has refused to recognize this ruling, and has instead nominated its own replacements to the court. Moreover they have passed a new law governing the operation of the court which requires all decisions to be passed by a 2/3 majority with the participation of at least 13 justices (out of 15 total).  The court in turn ruled that law unconstitutional, based on article 190 of the Polish Constitution, which states that only simple majority is required. Law and Justice Chairman Jarosław Kaczyński has said that it was appropriate to block the court from acting because it reflected the priorities of those who wanted to block his reforms.

[2] A reference to the pardoning of Marisuz Kamiński by President Andrzej Duda in November, 2015.  Kamiński was the former head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau  from 2006-2009, having been appointed to that office during the first PiS administration. He was later convicted of abuse of power, and sentenced to three years in prison.  His case was under appeal at the time of his pardon.  He is currently a minister-without-portfolio in the government.

[3] PiS believes that Donald Tusk was part of a conspiracy that led to a plane crash on April 10, 2010, which killed the President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński (Jarosław Kaczyński’s twin brother), along with 95 other Polish dignitaries. All the investigations into the disaster (aside from the ones carried out by PiS loyalists) have concluded that the crash was just a tragic accident.

[4] A reference to Minister Piotr Gliński, who attempted to block a theatrical production that he deemed “pornographic.”

[5] PiS won 37.58% of the vote, with a turnout rate of 50.92%: thus the figure of 18.7%.  They were able to transform that into a slim majority of parliamentary delegates, mostly because the electoral law in Poland eliminates all parties receiving less than 5% of the vote, distributing their votes proportionally to the larger parties.

[6] In January, 2016, the law was changed in order to eliminate the oversight of the country’s Commission for Radio and Television, instead making all personnel directly subordinate to the Treasury Ministry.  In the words of a PiS spokeswoman, “We hope that, at last, the media narrative that we do not agree with will cease to exist.”  An independent media does continue to exist in Poland, but the state-owned media dominates the airwaves.

[7] This law was passed, and signed into law on February 4. It was justified by the government as an anti-terrorism measure.

[8] This law was signed into law on January 7. It eliminates previous rules for competitive and open hiring procedures and gives relevant government ministers the authority to hire and fire at will anyone employed by the state.

[9] This interview can be found here.

[10] From a TV interview on December 11, 2014, available on video here, with English-language excerpts here.

[11] From a speech on December 13, 2015, available on video here, with English-language excerpts here.

[12] This requires a 2/3 majority in the parliament, but PiS is far short of that mark.

[13] On January 28, 2016, the Sejm passed a bill that would place all prosecutors under the direct authority of the Minister of Justice, to be hired or fired at will.

[14] This is actually a paraphrase of what Wałęsa said; his precise comments are here.


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PiS in their own words

If we are to fully grasp what is happening in Poland today, we must start with a nuanced understanding of the worldview of the Law and Justice movement (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS), and their leader, Jarosław Kaczyński.  With that in mind, I’ve translated an extended excerpt from the PiS party platform, supplemented by quotations from Chairman Kaczyński from both his earlier period in power (2005-2007) and more recently.

I offer this material under Creative Commons copyright, meaning that anyone is free to use this translation as long as they credit the source. The PiS program in the original Polish is available at http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty; the other texts are from public speeches that are widely available on multiple websites.

Please let me know if you identify any errors in the translation (see the contact tab above).

_________________________

Law and Justice Party Program, 2014

Our Principles and Values[1]

Translated and Annotated by Brian Porter-Szűcs

At the ideological foundation of the Law and Justice program lies respect for the inherent, inalienable dignity of every person. The protection of that dignity is the primary duty and the justification for existence of every political community. Dignity is the most elementary foundation of the rights of the human person. Three of those rights have particular importance: the right to life, the right to liberty, and the right to equality that is rooted in human solidarity.

The Right to Life

The right to life determines relations between individuals and the community in such a way as to exclude the possibility of making arbitrary decisions about taking the life of another person; it protects them also from acts of self-destruction. Today this refers above all to the protection of life from conception, as well as the rejection of euthanasia.

In these questions are position is clear: we protect and we will protect life and oppose euthanasia. But the problem is broader, because the right to life also determines the structure of society, which ought to be aimed at eliminating dangers to life resulting from material poverty, the brutalization of interpersonal relations, tolerating criminality, spreading racial, political, national, or cultural hatred. Defending the right to life, we nonetheless realize that the defense of the community and the individual from foreign and domestic aggression—in other words, guaranteeing public security—might demand risking the life of a soldier, a state official, and sometimes even citizens who are not performing a public function.

Liberty

Our stance regarding the protection of life does not contradict heroic values. We are convinced that only free people can effectively strive for their own success, and the success of their families, loved ones, and the community to which they belong—that is, the national community.

The existence of the individual is both individual and collective. Each of us takes advantage of the special gift that is intelligence and the ability to create higher values only thanks to our membership in communities of various kinds—beginning with the family, through local and professional communities, all the way to a society constituted through historical processes into a nation.

Solidarity

Full human existence is tied to belonging, which creates both rights and duties. We decisively reject the juxtaposition of individual liberty and the rights of the community. We consider this a false dichotomy. Both the right to life and to the liberty of the individual are tied to solidarity, which is the foundation of every community. Solidarity is inseparably tied to justice and equality.

Equality

We recognize the historical baggage that has left its mark on the definition of equality. We remember the horrible results of the social experiments (including crimes) that were justified by appealing to equality. We know that the aspiration to equality cannot mean the destruction of the individual characteristics of every person, or the creation of a system that would constrain the positive energy of people who are particularly creative in various areas of life, including economic life.

Justice

We treat the postulates of justice and equality as important premises in the construction of social order and of international relations, in such a way as to give, to the greatest degree possible, an equal chance in achieving a social position and material well being. But social advancement and the increasing of one’s wealth should proceed in accordance with moral principles and a desire to preserve respect for every individual. Therefore, from the beginning of its existence, Law and Justice evoked the social teachings of the universal Church.[2] In the encyclical Sollicitudo rei socialis Pope John Paul II wrote, “one must condemn the existence of economic mechanisms which, through they are directly by human will, function as if they were automatic, reinforcing the wealth of some and the poverty of others.” These words referred to relations between states, but they could certainly relate to domestic relations in society. This issue was raised by Pope Frances, too, when he emphasized that “just like the commandment ‘thou shall not kill’ established clear boundaries for ensuring the values of human life, so today we must say ‘no’ to an economy of exclusion and social inequality. Such an economy kills. The law supports the strong, so the might prey upon the weak. As a result of this situation the great mass of the population are excluded and marginalized, without work, without perspective, without a way out.”

These remarks were formulated on the bases of experience of territories outside of Europe, but nonetheless they point to the fatal phenomenon that appears, albeit in a much lesser degree, also in our nearest surroundings, in Poland. The postulates of justice and equality mean that one must condemn and reject the forms of social exclusion and economic inequality that are particularly burdensome for women.

The Community

The concept of community refers to various social groups, but the most important of them are the family and the nation. We consider the family, the foundation of which is the enduring union of a man and a woman, to be the fundamental structure of social life, in which are realized a person’s most essential needs, among which is the need for closeness with other people. In a family children are born, and thus is realized the fundamental condition for the perpetuation of humanity—the continuity of generations. It is precisely within the family that children are educated and prepared for participation in adult life. The family cannot be replaced—regardless of whether we look at it from the religious or secular perspective. Even in an entirely post-religious sense, it is the foundation of our civilization in its monogamous and enduring form.

The Nation

The nation, which we understand as a community of culture, language, historical experiences, political traditions, civilizational values, and lived fate, is the broadest social group constituting an effective foundation for a democratic political community.

We do not define the nation in an ethnic sense—not only because of our negative stance towards national superstitions, but also because of our familiarity with Polish history. The Polish nation was shaped and matured by joining into its community people of various ethnic belonging. An affirmation of national belonging also means, for us, a full willingness to recognize the agency of other national communities. Neither do we assume that the existence of nations must lead to destructive conflict, although at the same time we recognize that competition between nations is a very important characteristic of reality for the individual, and we recognize that this can lead to drastic consequences.

We do not treat belonging to the Polish nation as a value just because it was given by birth and cultural inheritance, but also because it results from a characteristic of our tradition. It is related in an inextricable way with Christianity and has an exceptionally strong connection to freedom and equality.

The Republic of Freedom and Equality

In past eras, freedom and equality were realized in an extremely defective way, relating only to the privileged strata that were identified with the nation. Despite unfavorable conditions, a democratic process broadening the concept of the Polish nation and citizenship to the plebian stratum—that is, the people—began in the 19th century, to be fully realized in the 20th. The most important Polish political movements—the insurrectionist, national, populist, and social democratic movements—played a huge role in this process. The universal Church also played a large role. The coronation of the aforementioned process was the creation of the Second Republic, which, from the beginning of its independent existence, introduced civic equality into the law, thus eliminating all differences between the estates, all limitations for women, all discrimination of nationalities. Labor laws and other regulations protecting economically weak social groups were also introduced. Regardless of the Second Republic’s crisis of democracy (understood as a mechanism of selecting governments)[3], these fundamental laws and the values stemming from them were never questioned.

The Enemies of Liberty and our Resistance

After the criminal German and Soviet occupation, the communists rejected these fundamental values, using force and applying mass repression. But the Poles challenged communism and rebelled in defense of traditional Polish values. We are referring above all to the many events in the history of the Polish People’s Republic, starting from the social resistance, the symbol of which became Stanisław Mikołajczyk and the “Cursed Soldiers,” and ending with the Solidarity movement from 1980-1988.[4]

It is characteristic that many anticommunist protests were tied to the defense of the Catholic faith and the universal Church. Memory of the fundamental values of Polishness were also revived, its symbols were evoked. The story of a free Poland and free Poles, repressed in every way by the Communist authorities, also revived. Historical memory received a special expression in the great and unique Solidarity movement, which strongly evoked the Polish tradition of liberty, equality, and solidarity based on justice. That movement could not have arisen were it not for the pontificate of John Paul II, His teachings, and His faith in national rebirth, which He demonstrated during his first pilgrimage to Poland.[5] His clearly-formulated patriotic thinking sank deep into social consciousness, and simultaneously became a stimulus for national rebirth: “There is no justice in Europe without an independent Poland,” “Let Your Spirit come down! Let Your Spirit come down! And renew the face of the earth. This earth!” “I beg you to once again accept with faith, hope, and love the entire spiritual heritage that is called ‘Poland.’”[6]

Poland’s Contribution to the History of Liberty

The teachings of the Catholic Church, Polish tradition, and Polish patriotism are tightly bound together, forming the political identity of the nation. Liberty is at the center of Christian teaching about the person; it is the essence of our national history; liberty constitutes the meaning of life for Poles. That’s why Polish national belonging, understood as a heritage of liberty, equality, and respect for human life, has a universal meaning. We see it as the contribution of our nation to the universal history of liberty.

The correspondence between the teachings of the Catholic Church and the national tradition is clearly evident with regards to the family. Polish tradition always treated the family as particularly valuable, and in the period when we lacked independence, the family was very often the foundation of national identity. In contemporary research the family is treated, as a rule, as something particularly valuable, as a means to an ever fuller self-realization in the history of our humanity. The universal nature and the universal value of Polish historical and cultural experience is not accidental, just as the unity of the mission that is expressed in Christianity, and which was captured in the social teachings of the Catholic Church and in Polish experience, is not accidental.

Relations to the Catholic Church

In our history the Church played, and continues to play, a unique role, different than in the history of other nations. It not only created our nation and our civilization, but also protected it—when the Church, already in the middle ages, rejected efforts by foreigners to rule, when later the first authors calling for a renewal of the Republic came from the clergy.[7] In the extremely unpropitious circumstances of the time when Poland was partitioned, just as in the Polish People’s Republic, the Church was the foundation of Polishness, and fulfilled its role as a substitute for the non-existent sovereign state. In this context, we must remember the person and the teachings of the Primate of the Millennium, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński.[8]

To this day, the Church sustains and proclaims moral teachings that are universally recognized in Poland. There is no competition in the wider society, so it is entirely correct to say that in Poland the moral teachings of the Church are opposed only by nihilism. For these reasons, the unique status of the Catholic Church in our national and state life is extraordinarily important. We want to maintain it, and we believe that attempts to destroy the Church, and unfair attacks on the Church, are threats to the form of our social life.

The State

The state is an organization of a global nature, which means that it encompasses in its activities all other organizations and social communities, including ethnic communities. It is a moral value, and its existence and activities must be grounded both in the ideological and historical spheres. One might say that a well-built state demands axiological and historical legitimacy.[9] The first kind of legitimacy is tightly connected with the subordinate role of the state vis-à-vis the nation. That subordinate role encompasses every function, but for us of particular importance is the defense of life, security, liberty, and solidarity based on justice, with which civic equality is tightly bound. Requirements of this sort can only be realized in a democratic state.

Democracy Overcomes the Dilemma of Security vs. Liberty

We decisively reject the idea, encountered often both now and historically, that there is an opposition in policy between security and liberty. Accepting a conception of the person based on personalism[10] and solidarity, grounded on justice and a vision of social order, one can overcome that contradiction by utilizing the mechanisms and procedures of democracy. Only democracy guarantees individual agency, that is, civic existence, and only in a democracy can one build a balance of social forces that will enable just policies and also guarantee the rule of law.

The Polish State as a Primary Value

The democratic state has, therefore, a basic significance for securing the realization of the fundamental rights of the individual. Democracy, as shown by historical experience and by the analyses of sociologists and political scientists, is effectively practiced only in national states. Democracy also demands the existence of so-called cultural factors, without which it is only a collection of procedures—practically a fiction. For us Poles, having our own state has an additional significance: for 123 years there wasn’t any sovereign Polish state.[11] We could not decide our own fate. This is the reason that we consider the Polish state to be a value of the greatest weight, and why any undermining of its sovereignty, or its very existence, is unacceptable and fatal. The state, after all, regardless of the method it arises, is the contemporary expression and defender of national interests.

Our state, our liberty, the democratic and solidaristic order cannot be treated in isolation from each other, abstracted from international relations in which globalization and the open society dominate, at least in Europe. Poles can, more or less frequently, have contact with other nations, which leads us to the conviction that the full realization of the values that constitute our nation is possible today only if it quickly develops in the economic and cultural spheres. The distance still separating us from wealthier and better organized societies will decrease, and then be entirely eliminated.

A Sense of our own Value and the Demographic Crisis

Looking at Poland during the first decades of the 21st century, at our accomplishments but also at the dangers we face, we must recognize that we will not achieve that goal if we do not stop the processes that weaken us, above all the demographic crisis, which is strengthened by the depopulation of Poland, by the emigration of people who don’t have work or are disappointed by their living conditions. There are clear signs that this is not a process determined only by economics. There are also cultural causes. One must only look at Hungary in order to confirm this thesis. A lack of a sense of one’s own value, the value of one’s culture, can be a factor that determines the strength of these negative processes.

An Effective State

Both rapid development and the elevation of Poles’ sense of their own value demand not only a sovereign and democratic state, but also an effective state. Only such a state can build a good level of legitimization for the authorities and the community, only it can create citizens with a high level of comfort in everyday life. Precisely for this reason, although we decisively reject etatism (that is, the desire to turn over to state control broad spheres of social life), we also reject the inability of the state to undertake necessary action in the defense of the community’s interests, the well-being of its citizens, and its own self-defense.

The state must have the real ability to fight pathologies, and it must not be permitted that its organs be exploited by external control centers that act for their own benefit. It is also unacceptable that the state would be incapable of mobilizing the forces and means for realizing great social or economic undertakings that are needed for the common good. Such a situation is contrary to the principle that the state serves the common good, which is the foundation of so-called practical legitimacy. Our own sovereign national state is, for us, a key value, because without it, it is impossible to realize the other values that we consider foundational.

Europe Strengthened by Diversity

The aforementioned reality of contemporary Europe requires us to pose a question regarding our relation to the ideas that stand at the foundation of a unifying Europe. We do not reject them; quite the contrary, we consider them very important and worth preserving. We think, however, that the richness of our continent and its civilization is the enormous diversity of Europeans. The only path that can ensure the strength and the development of Europe is to maintain this diversity as a permanent feature of the cultural landscape. Unification or the radical impoverishment of that diversity, replacing the cultural heritage with primitive civilizational experiments, will mean the weakening of our continent.

It would also mean an acceptance of hegemony, that is, the condition that the creators of the European Community decisively rejected, because the hegemony of one state across the continent would lead to a return to the policies that inevitably end with sharp conflicts and, ultimately, to war. The aspiration to avoid these consequences was at the foundation of the process of unifying Europe, which began in 1951. We want all of Europe to be a the sphere of liberty, equality, solidarity, and justice, and we think that the model of social life founded on the values of our tradition, when they are brought to life, can play a decisive role as a good example. We reject, however, all actions aimed at cultural unification. This is our credo for Europe: the continent of cultural diversity.

Euro-realism rather than Aggressive Political Correctness

We reject political correctness, that is, the limitation that is striking Europeans in ever more painful ways, thrust upon us nowadays not only by cultural aggression, but also by way of administration actions and judicial repression. We do not accept the uncontrolled erosion of the sovereignty of European fatherlands. We will defend our liberty decisively, erecting the strongest legal barriers against such practices vis-à-vis Poland. This is our Euro-realism.

It is Worthwhile to Hold our Values

It is worthwhile to be a Pole, to belong to our national community, and therefore it is worthwhile that Poland continues to exist and that it has its own state. A state that is sovereign, democratic, governed by law, but also effective. It is worthwhile for the Polish family to continue to exist and grow. Such a condition is possible, if we will develop as a nation, a community of free Poles, a community of Polish families, a democratic organism, a political agent and a cultural model. It is worthwhile for us to defend against threats to our liberty. We can achieve this if we overcome the demographic crisis, the crisis of the family, the crisis of parenthood and the problem of emigration, as well as the so-called middle-income trap in the economy.[12] Rapid development and the fundamental modernization of our economy are the best guarantees for improving the existence of Polish families. It is necessary to strengthen our state, our democracy in Poland, because without it we will not be in a position to reach our main goals.

In the chain of cause and effect, repairing the state is essentially in the first position. The state cannot be repaired immediately, but a change of government to one that is honest, not entangled in vague commitments,[13] guided by the principles of the common good, and capable of carrying out competent policies and having a plan of action—all this is an important step towards the repair of the state.

Repairing the state must be realized together with actions in the economic and social spheres. With the goal of gathering these actions into a coherent plan, it is necessary to carry out a diagnosis of the situation. This must be preceded by the most general formulation of needs, tied to the aspiration to repair the family and to escape from the middle-income trap. Both emigration and the crisis of the family have their material and cultural causes, such as the lack of work and of apartments, the lack of a family policy, the horrible health care system, very low pay and limitations in labor law, a general uncertainty in employment and an uncertainty about one’s future fate.

Emigration is caused by the aforementioned material insufficiencies, but also by the overall low level of comfort in life. There are so many forms of oppression that must be endured in our fatherland by citizens who find themselves in various social roles, for example, workers, farmers, businessmen, consumers, property owners, urban residents using public transportation, people who use the roads, parents, students, young adults, patients, retired people, people longing for access to high culture. Some of these social roles have a spiritual dimension. Without doubt, one of them is a role of particular weight: the role of being a Pole, which is so often devalued.

The spread of the ideology of gender is threatening for families and parents in Poland.[14] Its spread has an artificial character, conditioned above all by a stream of financial resources, mostly from abroad. Nonetheless, its activity grows, particularly among the youth, and it leads to a spread of conditions that are not conducive to forming families and having children. Setting up barriers against the spread of gender ideology is important. More important, though, are activities aimed at strengthening the family, defending parenthood, in particular the role of the mother and respect for motherhood, which ought to be treated not as a burden, but as a distinction and a privilege. Fatherhood should also be elevated to a higher rank, and the role of multi-child families must be underlined. Only by undertaking all these efforts together will we change the current unfavorable situation.

Escaping the Middle-Income Trap

Breaking out of the middle-income trap demands rejecting the claim that passivity is the only proper state policy vis-à-vis the economy. Active policies—that is, the enactment by the state of an economic policy—is the first condition of success. The second condition is the proper recognition, and then the exploitation, of resources that are today “dead,” or exploited to a limited degree. Among these we count financial resources, or other socially dynamic resources. One of the most important causes today for the insufficient utilization or the complete non-utilization of various resources are many pathologies, particularly corruption.
 

Social Energy

The necessary limitation of various pathologies will release social energy. Lasting repair of the state is necessary if we are to utilize this energy. Such repair does not require a change in the system of government, but only a well thought-out change in various parts of the state apparatus, the democratic mechanisms, including the control mechanisms. It also demands a strengthening of civil society. As we indicated, there exists a parallel need for actions regarding the repair of the state, the Polish family, and the economic sphere.

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From a speech by Jarosław Kaczyński on February 14, 2005, at the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw.

We do not hide the fact that it is necessary to base the constitution on the system of values that is the only one known, present, and binding through Polish society. The repository of this system of values is above all the Catholic Church. This is a system that appeals to Christianity and to the national tradition. Of course, this does not imply an attempt to build a denominational state. I want to underline this very strongly! I am only referring to the actually existing system of values. Poland isn’t the sort of country, like Holland for example, where three competing systems of values (Catholic, Protestant, and nondenominational) compete simultaneously. When constructing public life, it’s necessary to deal with reality. In the system that I’m talking about, there is nothing that would be unacceptable to a nonbeliever, unless he is a personal enemy of the Lord God. There are people like that in Poland, but they are a minority. I don’t think that it would be necessary to enter into any kind of special, far-reaching compromises with them.

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From a Speech by Jarosław Kaczyński in the Sejm, March 14, 2006

The process that took place in Poland over the past 17 years was presented here as a process of emancipation from oppression. The state, by its nature, should be an organization with an oppressive character….If you do not accept the theses of anarchism, then the state is a necessary institution, at least today, at least in these times in which we live, and the state, which has before itself a task as huge as taking upon itself the reconstruction of society after communism, must be…a strong institution (applause), because only then can it lead to the fulfillment of at least one of the elementary conditions for the existence of a normal democracy and a normal market: an equality of opportunity. Because, after all, at the beginning, after 1989 (everyone must admit this, it’s been researched and described by scholars) those opportunities were drastically unequal. There was a mighty network of communist officials and, tied to that, privileges of various sorts, including to a huge degree economic privileges and privileges that indirectly had an economic aspect, but could be very easily transformed into economic privileges; for example, access to information or access to administrative decisions. And there was a huge mass of people deprived of these privileges. I would permit myself to say…that the latter people were better than the former (applause).

But there was something else, which we must not forget. There was also a powerful collection of social pathologies that were created already in communism, and particularly in late communism: criminal pathologies, pathologies tied to corruption, with the decay of the state apparatus, with its criminalization, with the situation in the special services. And a strong government had had to fight this—or ought to have fought it, because unfortunately it did not fight. But we did not build that sort of strong government after 1989.

And why did the Solidarity camp not build that sort of government? Well, for various reasons. I do not want to reify any of them, but one of them that was absolutely essential was the rapid creation of a space for cooperation between the postcommunist forces and the forces (or rather, part of the forces) that emerged from the Solidarity camp. That space was a specific understanding of liberalism. That space was lumpenliberalism (applause).[15]

This is what enabled, on the one hand, abuses in the manner of building a capitalist economy, and on the other hand, it made it possible to claim (with all the seriousness in the world) that liberty consisted of sex shops…and that the main enemy of liberty in Poland was the Church. That’s how it was (applause). Everyone who remembers that time can recall this perfectly well….And indeed, a strong state, a strong government was not built in Poland. With all the consequences that come from that….

[Facing his opponents] You are all a collection or, one might say, a coalition of various local networks….If you think that someday you will come to power, you are mistaken….”

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From a TV interview with Jarosław Kaczyński, December 11, 2015.

This is a return to the methods of 2005-2007….This habit of denouncing Poland to foreigners. In Poland there is a fatal tradition of national treason. And this is precisely tied to that. It is sort of in the genes of some people, the worst sort of Poles. And that worst sort is precisely now extraordinarily active, because they feel threatened. Just consider that WWII, then communism, then the transformation were carried out in the way they were carried out: precisely this type of person dominated, was given every chance. They are afraid today that the times are changing, that the time is coming when things will be as they are supposed to be, and another type of person—that means, those having loftier, patriotic motivations—will be placed in the lead, and that will apply to every aspect of social life, including economic life.

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From a Speech by Jarosław Kaczyński on December 13, 2015.

 

There are those, and there were those yesterday, who say “we are defending democracy.” It is just like in 2006 and 2007. The opposition will act without any limits, it will attack the government, it will insult the president, just like happened yesterday. The majority of the media will attack, there will be peaceful demonstrations—yes, like the one yesterday. Is this democracy, or is it a dictatorship? They are trying to convince people that in the middle of a hot summer it is a freezing, harsh winter. And there are people who will hear something on television and be ready to believe it. They will go outside, dress in a winter coat, and still say that they are cold. But these are not people who are right in the head, who think correctly. Right here are the people who think, and who know perfectly well that in Poland there is no threat to democracy….

This is mostly about fear. About ensuring that the gigantic wave of abuse that took place over the past eight years does not come to light….Those who, during the so-called transformation, abandoned communism, gave up power for property—they want to continue to get fat. And those who were coopted into that group, too. Even if they allow crimes to take place….

And that’s what this is about. Not to give anything to the ordinary Pole, and make it possible to continue to rob Poland. That’s the meaning of this controversy. That is what this is all about. The Constitutional Tribunal was supposed to be the last defense…for that network. For everything that was bad and disgraceful over the past 26 years. And we want to change that. And therefore we must change the Tribunal. We must make it into an institution that will truly be for the citizens, that will defend the constitution, but not in a way that allows the constitution to apply to some but not others. That’s the meaning of what is happening today. We can say, finally, that the Warsaw common people already yesterday, during the demonstrations, managed to respond to that. It wouldn’t be appropriate for me to cite that response in full. It began this way: “All of Poland is laughing at you….

(a shout from the crowd: “communists and thieves!”)

Yes, sir. That’s what this is about. And that’s the whole truth about what is happening today in Poland. But we can’t simply laugh. We must triumph. You can count on us. We will manage. We will triumph!

We must ask, what is this really all about? Well, it’s clear. This is about the great reconstruction of Poland that we are undertaking, in the interests of the overwhelming majority of Poles. We must change Poland. We must make it more just, more solidaristic. Those are not words, those are concrete actions. They want to make it impossible for us to give 500 złoty to every child.[16] Will someone say why? Because we are giving it. That’s not permitted…. They do not want to permit that people over 75 years of age receive free medicine. That we try to increase incomes in Poland, that there will be a pact to raise pay. That Poles will begin to earn as much as would follow from our per capita income. Because they earn less that would follow from that.[17] They do not want to permit the disbanding of that band of cronies that they placed in the civil service.[18] And they don’t want to permit repairs to the judicial system—an institution, that is assessed by society with particular criticism, despite the fact that the media supports it very strongly.[19]

Do you want a justice system in which a poor person, a resident of a nursing home who buys himself a television, and later can’t pay the installments on his debt, lands in prison, but conspirators and gangsters remain free? Do you want farmers who want to buy Polish land to end up in prison, while those who hold guns to people’s heads are free? That’s how things look today….

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NOTES

[1] The program consists of two parts: “Point of Department” (with the subheadings “Our Principles and Values” and “Diagnosis”) and “A Project for Poland” (with the subheadings “Repairing the State,” “Economy and Development,” “Family,” “Society,” and “Poland in Europe and the World.”) The complete document is 168 pages long. Only the first sub-section is translated here.

[2] Throughout this text the authors frequently use the phrase “universal Church” (Kościół powszechny) rather than “Catholic Church” (Kościół katolicki).

[3] This is a reference to the military coup led by Józef Piłsudski in May of 1926.

[4] Stanisław Mikołajczyk was the leader of the Polish Peasant’s Party and the Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile from July 1943 to November 1944. In June of 1945 he returned to Poland in order to form a coalition government with the communists, but was pushed out of power and forced into exile in February 1947. The “Cursed Soldiers” (Żołnierze wyklęci) is a popular label for the WWII partisan forces that continued fighting even after the Nazis were pushed out of Poland, on the grounds that Soviet domination was merely another kind of occupation. Solidarity was a broad anticommunist movement that initially emerged from a labor protest, then expanded to encompass millions of Poles from every walk of life. It was outlawed in 1981, but continued to exist in conspiratorial form through the rest of the 1980s. Representatives of the Solidarity movement negotiated with the communists in 1989 to arrange a peaceful transition of power. Solidarity continues to exist as a labor union, and is closely affiliated with the Law and Justice Party.

[5] A reference to John Paul II’s trip to Poland in 1979, one year after beginning his pontificate. The capitalization of the pronouns is from the original.

[6] These are quotations from sermons delivered by John Paul II during that trip in 1979. The first passage is actually from Józef Piłsudski, though John Paul II did quote the line.

[7] Several of the most prominent figures of the Polish Enlightenment were priests, albeit controversial and heterodox ones.

[8] Stefan Wyszyński was the Primate from 1948-1981. At the time, the Primate (Prymas) was the leader of the Church in Poland, though after 1994 the position was transformed into an honorary one, and the chairman of the national council of bishops (who is elected with a five-year term) became the actual administrative head of the Church. After the celebration in 1966 of the 1000-year anniversary of the baptism of the first Christian ruler of Poland, Prince Mieszko, Cardinal Wyszyński became known as the “Primate of the Millennium.”

[9] Axiology is the philosophy study of value (in the ethical and aesthetic sense). Catholic authors in Poland often contrast neutral procedural democracy with an axiologically justified democracy based on Catholic values.

[10] The original Polish is not as repetitive: “personalistyczną koncepcję człowieka.” Catholic personalism is a philosophical and theological approach that contrasts “the person,” understood as both a material and spiritual being, with the liberal concept of “the individual.” Personalists argue that liberal individualism reduces us to a socially isolated, materialistic, nihilistic existence, and advocates instead a more holistic recognition of the inherent dignity of the socially embedded and spiritually elevated person.

[11] Between 1795 and 1918 there was no fully independent Polish state, though there were various semi-autonomous entities tied to either Russia, Prussia, or Austria-Hungary.

[12]Pułapka średniego rozwoju”: the idea that Poland is stuck in an intermediate position between the impoverished Third World and the wealthy First World, blocked from further advancement to the top tier.

[13] This is an allusion to the belief that previous Polish governments were led by people with ties to various “układy” (a term that could be translated roughly as “networks” or “conspiracies”), aimed at maintaining the power of a narrow elite (often operating behind the scenes).

[14] This phrase is used on the right in Poland to refer to the idea that gender roles are socially constructed, rather than inherent.

[15] A play on the term lumpenproletariat, a term used by Karl Marx to refer to the most degraded segments of the working class, the ones that would be the most difficult to ever elevate to class-consciousness.

[16] A reference to a plan to increase welfare benefits to families with multiple children.

[17] A reference to the fact that many Poles have incomes below the statistical average.

[18] The PiS government was purging the civil service, replacing hundreds of state employees with people who supported their party. To support this move, they argued that the current civil service staff supported the previous government.

[19] Probably a reference to the PiS government’s attempt to weaken the authority of the Constitutional Tribunal, or perhaps a reference to their plan to replace independent prosecutors with people responsible to the Minister of Justice.